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CRIMINAL LAW - EXTRA! EXTRA! READ ALL
ABOUT IT! "SEX OFFENDER'S REQUEST FOR
RECLASSIFICATION" - NOE V. SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRY BD., NO. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 MASS.
SUPER. LEXIS 9 (MASS. SUPER. CT. MAR. 28,
2017).
"We cast the net widely to make sure we got all the sex offenders.
Now, 15 years on, it turns out that really only a small percentage of people
convicted of sex offenses pose a true danger to the public."' This quote
illustrates why sex offenders should be able to reclassify their sex offender
level.2 InNoe v. Sex Offender Registry Board,3 the Superior Court of Suffolk
County addressed the proper standard of review in sex offender
reclassification cases and the appropriate burden of proof at sex offender
reclassification hearings.' The court held that the Sex Offender Registry
Board's ("Board") conclusion that Petitioner, sex offender, had not presented
sufficient evidence establishing a substantial change in circumstances that
could warrant a reduction in his classification level was a violation of
Petitioner's constitutional rights and a violation of law.5
' Lisa Sandberg, Texas GroupFights Sex Crime Stigma Members Call Unfair, CHRON (Dec.
14, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-group-fights-sexcrime-stigma-members-call-1773670.php (quoting Ray Allen, former Texas House Corrections
Chair, who helped implement tough sex registration bills).
2 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (discussing reclassification
amendment to Sex Offender Registry Law); see also Sarah Tofte, No Easy Answers Sex Offender
11,
2007),
(Sept.
WATCH
RIGHTS
HUMAN
US,
the
in
Laws
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-laws-us (analyzing effects
of sex offender laws in United States). According to the report by the Human Rights Watch, "sex
offender registration, community notification, and residency restriction laws are ill-considered,
poorly crafted, and may cause more harm than good." Tofte, supra note 2. The Human Rights
Watch is not suggesting that these laws are not needed, considering that sex offenses are very
serious crimes, but instead it believes they are simultaneously dangerous to individuals who do not
pose a true safety risk to the public. Tofte, supra note 2. Furthermore, the report addresses the
serious harms associated with registering as a sex offender, including: harassment; violence;
shattered privacy; social ostracism; diminished employment; and housing opportunities. Tofte,
supra note 2.
3 No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28,
2017) (citing case in chief).
4 See id. at *17-30 (explaining correct procedures for sex offender reclassifications).
See id. at *1-2 (concluding error of Board in Petitioner's reclassification case); see also
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178M (LexisNexis 2013) (governing judicial review of sex offender
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Daniel Noe, Petitioner, was convicted on five occasions for "open
and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior." 6 Noe's convictions never
derived from sexually violent offenses nor physical contact with others, yet
his reoccurring convictions were enough to classify him as a "Level 3" sex
offender - the highest classification level possible under the law.' Once
classified, Noe lived within the community for several years without any
subsequent sexual offenses.' However, Noe, like many other sex offenders,
found life difficult with a stigmatic Level 3 sex offender status attached to
his identity.' Thus, Noe submitted a request to the Board in January 2013

modification); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (discussing reclassification
amendment to Sex Offender Registry Law).
6 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 16 (LexisNexis 1987) (stipulating law); see also Noe v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *1, *9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Administrative Record at 117).
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (LexisNexis 1999) (defining sexually violent offense);
see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(c) (LexisNexis 1998) (stipulating Level 3 is reserved
for specific individuals). Under the statute, Level 3 is reserved for individuals whose "risk of
reoffense is high and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is such that a substantial
public safety interest is served by active dissemination" of the individual's identity and offense
history to the public. Id; Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *1, *9 (explaining all Petitioner's
convictions involved him exposing himself and masturbating in public).
See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *10 (describing sequence of events leading up to
issue).
9 See id. at *10 (quoting Administrative Record at 107) (finding Level 3 classification made it
"extremely difficult to put [his] life back together."); see also john972, Curse of a Sex Offender.
It's for the rest of your ife!, DAILY
Kos (Jul.
06, 2015,
5:40 PM),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2015/7/6/1399609/-Curse-of-a-Sex-Offender-It-s-for-the-restof-your-life (discussing effects of sex offender identification). The article illustrates sex offenders
suffer not only a jail sentence, but a life where their offenses become who they are in the eyes of
the public. John972, supra note 9. The article stipulates the following:
When you are listed on a sex offender registry, it's for life, a sanction that requires the
offender to be in regular contact with the authorities, to allow searches of his home every
90 days and to live far from schools, parks and other public places. His probation will
also require him to stay off the Internet, even though you may need it, for a job.
Id.; see also Mike Cernovich, The Hell ofSex Offender Registration, CRIME & FEDERALISM (July
26, 2010, 12:43 PM), http://www.crimeandfederalism.com/2010/07/the-hell-of-sex-offenderregistration.html (providing e-mails from sex-offenders discussing their life once they register).
One e-mail dictates:
I wake up and [can't] believe [what's] happen[ed]. [T]his has been going on now for 8
1/2 years[.] [I] have no job [;] [1] am broke[;] [I] have nothing[;] [I] am going to lose
my home [and] my parents pay for my bills[. . .. ] I lost my medical insurance when [I]
was fired from my job. [M]y savings are gone.
[I can't] form a relationship because who wants to be with a felon and a registered sex
offender?? I have lost friends [1] had. Now they changed how you have to register so
you have to pay for a [driver's] license every year and on top of that they charged $75 a
year just for the privilege of being a registered sex offender which they raised to $125
which [I] don't have the money to pay for [I] don't have any money because [1] was fired
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asking for a reduction in his classification level."o At the time, the Board had
not adopted regulations allowing sex offenders to put in a request for their
own reclassification hearing.II
Nonetheless, once the regulations became effective, Noe was
informed that a hearing would be conducted on February 24, 2014.12 During
the hearing, Noe represented himself.13 Noe offered no physical evidence of
the several years he lived in the community without any instance of reoffense. 14 In contrast to Noe's lack of evidence regarding his years without
offense, the Board offered a copy of Noe's request, an updated Board of
Probation Record, and evidence showing the Boston Police knew Noe was
seeking reclassification.s Two months later, the Board issued its decision
denying Noe's request.' 6 The Board concluded Noe "remained a high risk
of re-offense and a high degree of dangerousness." 17
Consequently, Noe initiated an action in the Superior Court seeking
judicial review of the Board's decision." Noe claimed, "the Board's denial

from my job and am now unemployable [.] I live off my parents who [cannot] afford it.
[M]y life is a pure hell. [I] am 10 years older now and unemployed [,] all my savings
which [I] had saved for retirement is GONE! but [I] want people to know....
Id.
10 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *1, *10 (quoting Administrative Record at 107)
(discussing when and how Petitioner submitted request). Furthermore, Petitioner prepared and
submitted his request without the assistance of counsel and had no supporting documentation or
other evidence accompanying the request. Id.
1 See id at *11 (explaining Second Path Regulations had not been implemented yet); see also
infra p. 17 and accompanying notes 30, 33 (discussing Second Path Regulation in depth).
12 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *12 (quoting Administrative Record at 139-144)
(showing Board sent Petitioner notice accepting request for hearing). Furthermore, stipulating
"[t]he burden [will be] on you to show that your risk to reoffend and your degree of dangerousness
has decreased since your previous classification." Id. Additionally, the Board's notice also stated
Petitioner could have legal counsel represent him at hearing and that "there [would] not be counsel
appointed" for him. Id.
13 See id. at *12 (discussing Petitioner appearing at hearing pro se).
14 See Board's Reclassification Decision at 2-3, Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No.
SUCV2014-02071-A (2017) (No.22.0) (providing Petitioner represented himself and offered no
physical evidence on his behalf). The decision indicates Petitioner did not call independent
witnesses, offer any exhibits, nor file motions on his own behalf Id at 2.
15 See id. at 2 (giving relevant background contributing to police knowledge).
16 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *13 (concluding Petitioner remained high-risk).
17 See id. at *13 (explaining why Board denied Petitioner's request). The Board directly states
in its decision, "[s]ince his January 2007 Level 3 decision, [Petitioner] has remained offense free
to the community for approximately seven years" and "has maintained sobriety for approximately
five and [one-half] years." Id. The decision goes on to say that regardless, Petitioner, "remains a
high risk of reoffense and a high degree of dangerousness . . ." and thus, should "continue to register
as a Level 3 sex offender in accordance with G.L.c. 6, § 178K(2)(c)." Id. at *14.
1
See id. (initiating action with Supreme Judicial Court to review hearing decision).
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of his request for reclassification . . was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse
of discretion, and unsupported by substantial evidence." 19
During this time, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC")
issued its decision in Doe 380316 ("Doe"),2 0 holding that a different
standard of proof was necessary in order to satisfy due process.2 1 The SJC
further clarified its ruling would be exercised "retroactively to classification
proceedings pending before the Board, the Superior Court, or the appellate
courts."22 The Board attempted to dismiss the complaint and give Noe
another chance to demonstrate an earned lowering of his sex offender level
pursuant to the SJC holding in Doe, but Noe declined.2 3 The Superior Court
now has an opportunity to address the validity and constitutionality of the
Board's denial of Noe's reclassification request.24 Ultimately, the SJC held
that the Board violated Petitioner's constitutional rights and simultaneously
violated state law.25
In 1996, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted an initial sex
offender registry law, but later amended it after a series of judicial opinions
exposed weaknesses in the original language.2 6 However, the rules
19 Id.; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30, § 14 (LexisNexis 2015) (discussing appeals from
final decisions of agencies in adjudicatory proceedings).
20 See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 41 N.E.3d
1058 (Mass. 2015) (acknowledging different standard should apply).
21 See id. at 1067-69 (finding clear and convincing evidence is correct standard of proof).
22 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *15 (explaining what would follow its decision);
Doe 380316, 41 N.E.3d at 314 (setting forth new standard of proof for sex offender classifications
in Commonwealth).
23 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *16 (mentioning Board's attempt to amend
petitioner's hearing).
24 See id. (discussing Board's new precedent).
25 See id. at *1-2 (concluding Board's error in Petitioner's reclassification case).
26 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178D (LexisNexis 2013) (discussing establishment and
maintenance of sex offender registry); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L (LexisNexis 2013)
(explaining classification of offenders and offenders right to hearing); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §
178P (LexisNexis 2013) (authorizing police officer's to arrest sex offenders for failure to comply
with registration requirements); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K (LexisNexis 2013) (discussing
role ofBoard); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (LexisNexis 2011) (defining words within statute);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178M (LexisNexis 2011) (implementing modification or risk
designation); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178F (LexisNexis 2010) (discussing verification of
registration data); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (LexisNexis 2010) (providing what happens
when there was failure to register or verify registration information); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §
178Q (LexisNexis 2010) (assessing seventy-five dollars registration fee upon every sex offender);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178J (LexisNexis 2008) (dictating procedures for making request for
sex offender registry information); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178E (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining
transmission of registration data to board and sex offender's duty to register); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 6, § 178G (LexisNexis 2003) (establishing duration of duty to register); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
6, § 1780 (LexisNexis 2003) (granting police officials and public employees immunity in civil or
criminal proceedings); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 1781 (LexisNexis 1999) (stipulating importance
of public access to sex offender registry); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178N (LexisNexis 1999)
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governing reclassification of a sex offender's level, upward or downward,
are fairly new.2 7 In 2013, the Legislature amended parts of the law to grant
the Board power to change sex offender classification upon receipt of new
information determining the potential safety risk of the offender.2 8
Furthermore, the amended law allowed the Board to "promulgate
regulations defining such new information and [established] procedures
relative to a reclassification hearing."2 9 Despite the changes to the law,
(warning of unlawful use of sex offender registry information). See generally Doe v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., 857 N.E.2d 473, 477-78 (Mass. 2006) (stipulating fault in statute). The court
summarizes the statute, as written provides:
A person convicted of any of the enumerated sex offenses on or after August 1, 1981, or
released on or after August 1, 1981, from confinement, parole, or probation supervision
following a conviction of one of these offenses, is a "[s]ex offender" . . .provides for the
appointment by the Governor of a seven-member sex offender registry board. A sex
offender who lives or works in the Commonwealth must register with the board by mail,
listing his name, home address, and (if applicable) work address, or his intended home
and work addresses . . . [and] provides for post-registration hearings and mandates the
order of priority in which offenders are to be reviewed. The board is to promulgate
guidelines for classifying an offender's level of dangerousness and risk of reoffense and
apply those guidelines to assess the risk level of particular offenders . . . . Once an
offender receives notice from the board of its initial recommended classification, he can
request an evidentiary hearing to determine his future duty to register and his final
classification. The board then assigns a final risk classification level: level one (low);
level two (moderate); or level three (high). Offenders may seek judicial review pursuant
to G.L.c. 30A, § 14, ofthe board's final classification and registration requirements ....
Id. at 477-78.
27 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L (codifying sex offenders right to hearing). The
Legislature amended the rules governing reclassification to authorize the Board, on its own
initiative or upon written request by a police department or district attorney, to reclassify any
registered and finally classified sex offender in the event new relevant information to a
determination of a risk of re-offense or degree of dangerousness is received. Id.; see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (codifying amendment to Sex Offender Registry
Law). The Registry Law, as amended, also empowers the Board to promulgate regulations defining
such new information and establishing the procedures relative to a reclassification hearing held for
this purpose, provided, however, certain procedural safeguards are followed. Id.
28 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (granting Board new powers).
29 Id. (giving Board broad discretion in reclassification hearings). The law further stipulates
the following:
(i) the hearing is conducted according to the standard rules of adjudicatory procedure or
other rules which the board may promulgate, (ii) the hearing is conducted in a reasonable
time, and (iii) the sex offender is provided prompt notice of the hearing, which includes:
the new information that led the board to seek reclassification of the offender, the
offender's right to challenge the reclassification, the offender's right to submit to the
board documentary evidence relative to his risk of reoffense and the degree of
dangerousness posed to the public, the offender's right to retain counsel for the hearing,
and the offender's right to have counsel appointed if the offender is indigent, as
determined by the board using the standards in chapter 21 1D.
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sections of the statute remained vague concerning distinctions in the
different types of reclassification hearings and who bears the burden of
proof"o The Board supplemented the statute by adopting regulations
creating two different procedural paths for sex offender reclassification
hearings.3
The first path dictates the procedure the Board takes when they want
to reclassify an offender.32 The second path establishes the steps an offender
Any
can take when they submit a request to change classification.
reclassification decision issued pursuant to either path is considered

Id.
30 See "First Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.37C(10) (2013) (describing what
occurs when Board brings case); see also "Second Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. §
1.37C(l)-(9) (2013) (establishing procedure when offender brings case).
31 See "First Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.37C(10) (2013) (describing what
occurs when Board brings case); see also "Second Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. §
1.37C(l)-(9) (2013) (establishing what occurs when an offender brings a case).
32 See "First Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.37C(10) (2013) (regulating what
occurs when Board brings hearing). The first path, titled "Board Seeks Reclassification of Sex
Offender," applies to cases in which the Board, "on its own initiative, seek[s] to reclassify any
registered and finally classified sex offender upon Receipt of any information that indicates
offender may present an increased risk to reoffend or degree of dangerousness." Id Furthermore,
reclassification hearings conducted pursuant to the First Path Regulations incorporate all procedural
protections mandated by amended Section 178L, including right to notice, right to offer evidence
relative to his or her risk of re-offense and degree of dangerousness posed to public, right to be
represented by counsel at reclassification hearing, and right to have counsel appointed if indigent.
Id. § 1.37C(10)(c) (incorporating, by reference, all procedures and protections pertaining to initial
classification hearings). The First Path Regulations also provide that the Board bears the burden
of proof in any reclassification hearing conducted pursuant to those regulations. Id. § 1.10(1)
(incorporating, by reference, in the Board's First Path Regulations at § 1.37C(10)(c)).
3 See "Second Path Regulations," 803 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.37C(l)-(9) (2013) (regulating
what occurs when offender brings hearing). The Board's Second Path Regulations permits a
registered Level 2 or Level 3 sex offender who has not been convicted of a new sex offense to "file
a written motion with the Board to re-examine his or her classification level" no sooner than "three
years after the date of his [or her] final classification." Id § 1.37C(2)(a) (discussing procedure for
offender to file motion for classification). Any request for reclassification submitted by a registered
sex offender is subject to a mandatory hearing before "a panel of hearing examiners or a single
hearing examiner" appointed by the Board's Chair. Id § 1.37C(5). Reclassification hearings
conducted pursuant to Second Path Regulations, however, do not incorporate all of the procedural
protections mandated by amended Section 178L. Id. For example, while the Board's Second Path
Regulations permit a sex offender to be "represented at the [reclassification] hearing by privately
retained counsel or an authorized representative," they do not provide for appointment of counsel
for indigent sex offenders. Id. § 1.37C(5)(d). The Board's Second Path Regulation places the
burden on sex offender to prove at reclassification hearing "his or her risk of reoffense and the
degree of dangerousness he or she poses to the public has decreased since his or her final
classification." Id § 1.37C(2)(c).
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"final." 3 4 However, any decision by the Board is subject to judicial review
pursuant to regulations under MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14.
The court in Noe found the Board's conclusion, that Noe had not
presented sufficient evidence establishing a sufficient change in
circumstances warranting a reduction in his level, was a violation of
Petitioner's constitutional rights and a violation of law.3 6 The court
considered numerous elements of Noe's case by "[giving] due weight to the
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the board
as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.""3

Furthermore,

in order to evaluate whether the Board violated Noe's due process rights, the
court utilized the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge.38 In Mathews, the
34 See MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (LexisNexis 2015) (dictating procedure for appeals
from final decisions of agencies and adjudicatory proceedings).
35 See id. (stipulating procedure for appeals process). The statute specifically states, "[e]xcept
so far as any provision of law expressly precludes judicial review, any person or appointing
authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding, whether such
decision is affirmative or negative in form, shall be entitled to a judicial review thereof" Id.
36 See Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS
9 *1, *18-30 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017) (discussing court's conclusion).
3 Id. at *18 (citing Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 947 N.E.2d 9, 34 (Mass. 2011))
(explaining specific factors the court considered); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14(7)
(LexisNexis 2017) (citing law governing appeals from final decisions of agencies in adjudicatory
proceedings). The law specifically states that,
[tlhe court may affirm the decision of the agency, or remand the matter for further
proceedings before the agency; or the court may set aside or modify the decision, or
compel any action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if it determines that the
substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision
is(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) Based upon an error of law; or
(d) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence; or
(f) Unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record as submitted or as
amplified under paragraph (6) of this section, in those instances where the court is
constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact; or
(g) Arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.

§ 14(7).
38 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (addressing due process). The
Mathews court notes that in recent years, courts are more inclined to consider the extent to which

due process requires evidentiary hearings prior to the deprivation of some interest. Mathews, 424
U.S. at 333. According to Mathews, due process requires the following factors:
[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
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court balanced: "the private interests affected by an agency decision; the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of those interests; the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the governmental
interests involved." 39
The Noe court proceeded to evaluate the arguments of both parties
concerning the allocation of the burden of proof at sex offender
reclassification hearings and the Petitioner's right to counsel at the hearing.4 0
The court applied the due process test established in Mathews and concluded
that the existing regulations, which placed a burden on the offender to prove
his risk of re-offense or degree of dangerousness had lowered, violated the
offender's rights to due process.41 In addition, the court used the test dictated
in In re Erin4 2 to support its conclusion that a sex offender seeking
reclassification is required to show by clear and convincing evidence that a
decrease in his or her sex offender level is required.4 3 Lastly, the court
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. See also Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *18-19 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017)
(discussing Mathews test for level of due process); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v.
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 41 N.E.3d 1058, 1063-70 (Mass. 2015) (discussing effect of subsequent
developments in Sex Registry law on Matthews analysis). Doe summarizes the SJC and states
"balances the private interests affected by an agency decision; the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of those interests; the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
the governmental interests involved." Doe, 41 N.E.3d at 1063. Therefore, the Mathews due process
test takes into consideration the interests at stake. Id. at 1068.
39 Doe, 41 N.E.3d at 1063; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (emphasizing right to hearing
when deprived of property interest).
40 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *19-40 (establishing what issues court specifically
analyzed); see generally, Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 69 N.E.3d 573, 580-81 (Mass. 2017)
(discussing rule of lenity). Under the rule of lenity, if the court discovers that "[a] statute is
ambiguous or [is] unable to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the
benefit of any rational doubt." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 13 N.E.3d 989, 995
(Mass. 2014)).
41 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-35 (addressing due process). The Mathews court stipulated
that in recent years, courts are more inclined to consider the extent to which due process requires
evidentiary hearings prior to the deprivation of an interest. Id. at 333.
42 823 N.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Mass. 2005) (describing clear and convincing evidence).
43 See Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS
9 *1, *24-30 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017) (concluding sex offender bears burden of production
n reclassification proceedings); see also Erin, 823 N.E.2d at 360-61 (dictating correct burden of
proof). The court in Erin discussed the correct burden in child custody cases and stated, "it is never
permissible in an initial care and protection proceeding to shift the burden of proof to the respondent
parent." Erin, 823 N.E.2d at 361. The court emphasized that a review and redetermination
proceeding is a readjudication of the custody order; therefore, "it implicates the same liberty
interests that exist at an initial determination that a child is in need of care and protection." Id. The
court in Noe analogized between Noe and the mother in Erin, and believed that a reclassification
hearing is a readjudication of the former proceeding; thus, the same level of interest exists as
identified by the court in Erin. See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *26-27.
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addressed an offender's right to assistance of counsel at reclassification
hearings by looking directly at the Sex Offender Registry Law." The court
remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings with instructions to
utilize the test established in Mathews and Erin and allow Noe assistance of
counsel.
The court in Noe, followed all requisite steps in determining whether
a violation of due process occurred and examined each of petitioners claims
to create clarity within the Sex Offender Registry Law.' First, the court
addressed the problem with assigning the burden of proof to the offender at
a reclassification hearing.4 7 As such, the court correctly recognized that a
sex offender has sufficient liberty and privacy interest at stake that are
constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
4 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *30-39 (discussing sex offender's right to
assistance of counsel); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (discussing
petitioner's right to counsel at reclassification hearing). Section 3 of the statute dictates,
The board may, on its own initiative or upon written request by a police department or
district attorney, seek to reclassify any registered and finally classified sex offender in
the event that new information, which is relevant to a determination of a risk of reoffense or degree of dangerousness, is received. The board shall promulgate regulations
defining such new information and establishing the procedures relative to a
reclassification hearing held for this purpose; provided that (i) the hearing is conducted
according to the standard rules of adjudicatory procedure or other rules which the board
may promulgate, (ii) the hearing is conducted in a reasonable time, and (iii) the sex
offender is provided prompt notice of the hearing, which includes: the new information
that led the board to seek reclassification of the offender, the offender's right to challenge
the reclassification, the offender's right to submit to the board documentary evidence
relative to his risk of reoffense and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public, the
offender's right to retain counsel for the hearing, and the offender's right to have counsel
appointed if the offender is indigent, as determined by the board using the standards in
chapter 21lD. An indigent offender may also apply for and the board may grant payment
of fees for an expert. witness in any case in which the board intends to rely on the
testimony or report of an expert witness prepared specifically for the purposes of the
reclassification proceeding. The failure of the offender to attend the hearing may result
in a waiver of the offender's rights and the board's recommended reclassification
becoming final.

§ 178L(3).
45 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *40.41 (remanding case back to board).
46 See id. at *19 (recognizing Sex Offender Registry Law is vague as to which party bears
burden of proof).
47 See id. at *19-28 (analyzing Mathews and Erin test). Due to the vagueness of the Sex
Offender Registry Law, the court in Noe had to examine whether shifting the burden to petitioner
violated his due process rights. Id. at *20. The court denounced the Board's contention that there
was no liberty interest at stake for the Petitioner and stated that twenty years ago a sex offender had
"sufficient liberty and privacy interests constitutionally protected by art. 12 [of the state
Constitution] that he is entitled to procedural due process before he may be required to register and
before information may properly be publicly disclosed about him." Id. at *21 (quoting Doe v. AG,
686 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Mass. 1997)).
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Constitution and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.48
Moreover, the court emphasized how intrusive, humiliating and continuous
sex offender registration is to the individual themselves. 49 The court stresses
how an opportunity to reclassify a sex offender status balances the purpose
of the Sex Offender Registry Law but also provides a mechanism for
protection of an offender's constitutionally based rights. 0 Therefore,
reclassification is necessary to public safety because it helps to separate
sexual predators likely to repeat their offenses from other offenders who no
longer pose any danger."
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (establishing equal protection); see also MASS. CONST. art.
XII, pt. I (dictating constitutional rights); Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. SUCV201402071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9 *1, at *20 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017) (rejecting
Board's argument that Petitioner has no liberty interest at stake). The court listed numerous cases
that contradicted the Board's proposition. See Doe v. AG, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1012-13 (Mass. 1997)
(recognizing the need to safeguard liberty interest). This court discussed the implications of
publicly disclosing sex offender information and advocated that - because of the abrasive and
humiliating nature that sex offender registration creates - there is a need to protect the liberty
interest of the offender once he or she is able to reclassify themselves based on their reduction in
dangerousness. See Poe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 926 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2010) ("At stake
in a classification hearing is the sex offender's constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest
in avoiding registration and public dissemination of registration information."); Doe v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512, 518 (Mass. 1998) ("Sex offenders have a constitutionally
protected liberty and privacy interest in avoiding registration and public dissemination of
registration information.").
49 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9, at *23 (quoting Doe v. AG, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016
(Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring)) ("Sex offender registration 'is a continuing, intrusive, and
humiliating regulation of the person himself.'); see also Tofte, supra note 2 (discussing the effects
of registering as a sex offender). Tofte addresses the real effects associated with sex offender
registration and how some offenders' name on a registry list can ensure a life of harassment, and
continuously being classified as an offender whom no one wants to associate their business,
residencies, or friendships with. See Tofte, supra n. 2; John972, supra note 9 (illustrating real life
example of what occurs once labeled sex offender); Cernovich, supra note 9 (giving another
example of being branded as sex offender).
so See Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 971 N.E.2d 800, 808 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)
(discussing what reclassification does). The court stipulated:
the opportunity for reclassification balances the clearly articulated purpose of the
legislation to protect vulnerable victims with the also clearly articulated constitutional
rights of a sex offender. It provides the sole mechanism for protection of an offender's
constitutionally based rights where the passage of time has reduced the risk of
dangerousness such that the Commonwealth's interest in disclosure is eroded, properly
permitting him to obtain a lower classification level.
Id. at 809 n.11.
5' See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 18 N.E.3d
1081, 1085 (Mass. 2014) (quoting Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 697 N.E.2d 512, 521 (Mass.
1998) (Marshall, J. concurring)) ("We have emphasized that the sex offender registration
requirement 'implicates constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests.' Accordingly,
'careful and individualized due process is necessary to sort sexual predators likely to repeat their
crimes from large numbers of offenders who pose no danger to the public."'). The ongoing liberty
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Moreover, the court was equally correct in its conclusion that
although the Board bore the ultimate burden of proof at a reclassification
hearing, the offender is still required to bear the initial burden of
production.5 2 The court addressed the findings in Erin and argued that it can
be logically applied to the Board's proceedings. on petitioner's request for
reclassification. 5 3
The court believed that petitioner's request for
reclassification effectively constituted a reajudication of the Board's initial
determination to classify Noe as a Level 3 sex offender.54 Thus, it was
essential that petitioner's reclassification cannot be abrogated without clear
and convincing evidence.

interest involved in sex offender classification and notification requirements make it clear that a
sex offender is entitled to an individualized determination as to whether the individual currently
poses a risk to public safety; regardless, his or her liberty interest is protected as long as they remain
obligated to register with the Board. Id.; see also Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No.
MICV2010-4044-A, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 29, at *12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2011)
("[O]nce classified, a registered sex offender has a liberty and privacy interest in obtaining a lower
classification some years after the initial classification, if the facts warrant.").
52 See In re Erin, 823 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Mass. 2005) (requiring the parent bear initial burden
of production in order to trigger redetermination proceedings). The court in Erin held that,
[a]lthough the department retains the ultimate burden of showing that the child is still in
need of care and protection, we conclude that the party filing a petition for review and
redetermination has an initial burden of production that must be met in order to trigger
the department's burden. The party filing the petition must present some credible
evidence that circumstances have changed since the initial determination such that the
child may no longer be in need of care and protection. Once the party filing the petition
meets its burden of production, the department must make its showing.
Id.
53 See id. (finding Erin's analysis on burden of proof applicable to case at hand).
54 See Erin, 823 N.E.2d at 360-61 (explaining correct burden of proof). The court in Erin
discussed the correct burden in child custody cases and stated, "it is never permissible in an initial
care and protection proceeding to shift the burden of proof to the respondent parent." Id at 361.
The court emphasized that a review and redetermination proceeding are a readjudication of the
custody order and stressed that such proceedings, "implicat[e] the same liberty interests that exist
at an initial determination that a child is need of care and protection." Id. In Noe, the SJC compared
the sex offender reclassification proceeding at issue with the parent custody proceeding in Erin,
and concluded that both processes implicated the same liberty interests. See Noe v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9 at *26-28 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2017).
5 See Custody of a Minor, 452 N.E.2d 483, 490 (Mass. 1983) (holding that "[e]vidence that
is at least 'clear and convincing' is constitutionally required for a finding of parental unfitness.");
see also Erin, 823 N.E.2d at 360-61 (requiring DCF prove parent unfit by clear and convincing
evidence). Similarly, the court in Noe applies this standard. See Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,
No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9 at *30 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017)
(citing Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 41 N.E.3d
1058, 1072 (Mass. 2015)) (recognizing sex offender risk classifications must be established by
clear and convincing evidence to satisfy due process).
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Lastly, the court addressed the issue of petitioner's right to
assistance of counsel.56 The Sex Offender Registry Law stipulated that sex
offenders are entitled to assistance of appointed counsel at reclassification
hearings. The court correctly read the law to provide that even indigent sex
offenders are entitled to appointed counsel due to the general legislative
desire to ensure that sex offenders have effective legal representation at all
levels of the registration and classification process.s Even if the law itself
placed doubt on this proposition, petitioner would still be granted an
appointed attorney under the "rule of lenity."59 Under the rule of lenity, if
the court "find[s] that [a] statute is ambiguous or [is] unable to ascertain the
intent of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any
rational doubt."60 Nonetheless, the court found Petitioner, Noe, was entitled
to counsel. 6
The Sex Offender Registry Laws protect the safety of the public but
also protect the rights of the offender. It is essential to the judicial system
that agencies like the Sex Offender Registry Board, properly follow the
principles of the laws that govern the lives of offenders. The law itself is
markedly intrusive and causes substantial effects to the lives of the
individuals who must follow the rules established within it. The court in Noe
stepped in and sifted through the unambiguous parts of the law and
essentially reminded the Board of their obligations. Now, it is imperative
that the Board continues to set forth the correct standard for reclassification
hearings by using the courts findings to promote a fairer justice system.
Keshia L. Blair

56 See Noe, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9 at *30-31, *38 (establishing petitioners right to
counsel).
5 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (codifying petitioner's right to
counsel).
58 See § 178(3) (establishing right to counsel). Section 178(3) describes sex offender's rights
in a hearing to challenge classification, stating that "the hearing [shall be conducted] according to
the standard rules of adjudicatory procedure or other rules which the board may promulgate . .. the
[offender has a] right to retain counsel for the hearing, and the [offender has a] right to have counsel
appointed if the offender is indigent." Id.
59 See Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 69 N.E.3d 573, 580-81 (Mass. 2017) (discussing rule of
lenity). Under the rule of lenity, if the court discovers that "[a] statute is ambiguous or [is] unable
to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any rational
doubt." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 13 N.E.3d 989, 994 (Mass. 2014)).
60 Noe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9
at *37 (citing Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 69 N.E.3d 573, 580-81 (Mass. 2017)) (explaining rule
of lenity and its application).
61 See Noe, No. SUCV2014-02071-A, 2017 Mass. Super. LEXIS 9 at *37-38 (applying rule
of lenity and § 178(3) about right to counsel).

